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ABSTRACT: We present empirical evidence from social psychological research which suggests that
standard methods (“show & tell”) employed when teaching the heuristics and biases program in the
context of critical thinking (CT) instruction are likelier to facilitate the discernment and correction of
biases in others’ reasoning than to have a similar effect in the self-monitoring case. Exemplified by
the social phenomenon of false polarization, we suggest that CT instruction may be improved by
fostering student’s abilities at counterfactual meta-cognition, and present a corresponding teaching
and learning activity.
KEYWORDS: biases, counterfactual meta-cognition, critical thinking instruction, false polarization,
teaching and learning activity

1. INTRODUCTION
According to the heuristics and biases program in social psychology (e.g., Gigerenzer
et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman, 2011; Sahlin et al., 2010; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), when acquiring and evaluating information in order to acquire,
sustain, or change belief, humans regularly entertain search rules (aka heuristics)
that are under-complex (biased) and regularly terminated before an optimal result
is achieved (satisficing). It is natural to assume that making agents aware of such
biases would also tend to de-bias them—i.e., minimize the effects of biases in their
own reasoning and belief. However, experimental evidence suggests that merely
teaching people that they are likely subject to biases is a rather ineffective means of
de-biasing them. A “deeper” engagement with agents’ cognitive skills and practices
appears to be required in order for de-biasing to function as a self-corrective
contribution to better judgment and action.
The following motivates and describes a teaching and learning activity (TLA)
which should improve learners’ ability to self-discern and self-correct their own
biases. The purpose is to assist instructors of critical thinking courses in designing
and deploying this TLA either in a dedicated course or as an instrument in “critical
thinking across the curriculum.” The TLA is based on experimental studies carried
out in social psychology, but it has (to the author’s knowledge) not been
systematically tested in a class room setting, so far. In the terms of Fischhoff (2010),
the TLA constitutes an item of prescriptive interventionism.
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-11.
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After briefly describing biases (Sect. 2), we present our test case, false
polarization, as a social phenomenon that is sustained by biases and their ascription
(3). Subsequently, we lay out a route along which the ability to self-discern biases
may be improved (4). We then describe the TLA, both analytically and sequentially,
formulate learning outcomes and assessment techniques (5), and close with a
discussion (6) plus summary (7).
2. BIASES
Larrick (2008, p. 319f.) offers a useful distinction between three basic types of
errors in human reasoning and decision making that are owed to biases: (i)
psychophysically-based errors such as reference point effects, e.g., the overweighing
of the most recently received information vis-à-vis all information received; (ii)
association-based errors, e.g., deciding on the basis of so far available evidence
rather than searching for more complete/representative evidence; and (iii) strategybased errors, e.g., the use of inferior strategies or decision rules, such as “a bird in
the hand is worth two in the bush.” As he further points out, “many biases are
multiply-determined” (ibid.)
Biases, and the framing effects to which they can give rise (see below), are
considered latent: subjects are normally unaware that a bias is “at work.” This being
so may be found explained in terms of an evolutionary inheritance as the result of
“coping” with natural and social environments in ways that deliver acceptable
results in some or perhaps even most cases. It is therefore only half-joking to speak
of “Simple heuristics that make us smart [enough to get by]” (Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).
With some simplification, what contemporary social psychologists have come
to call “biases,” philosophers and scholars of law, amongst others, have long known
as “fallacies.” The latter two fields share a tradition in Aristotelian scholarship,
specifically the critiques of the Sophistic mode of audience persuasion—in response
to which the identification and classification of fallacies arose as a scholarly topic
(Conley, 1990). Amongst others, the 16th century Francis Bacon’s idolatry or the
17th century John Locke’s naming of a range of fallacies fronted by ‘ad’ (e.g., ad
hominem) have continued this tradition into the modern age. With Hamblin’s (1970)
standard work, fallacies have come to be “bread and butter” in speech
communication, rhetoric, and argumentation studies.
In the discussion that is nowadays centered in the cognitive sciences, widely
understood, terms such as “anchoring” are—for reasons one might speculate
about—often treated as recent discoveries, although predecessor terms may almost
always be identified, sometimes as far back as the 4th and 5th centuries BC. It
transpires that biases and fallacies are intimately related. It is standard parlance to
reference a bias—understood as the psychological, or internal, and non-directly
observable or ascribed part—in order to explain why a fallacy—as the behavioral,
or external, and directly observable part—came about. Generally speaking, the
recent empirical study of human reasoning under controlled experimental
conditions has delivered important quantified results. Such may well count as
historical novelties, but the phenomena are certainly much older.
2
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Although scholarly disagreement continues to persist with respect to the
interpretation of various “classical” reasoning tasks—such as the “Linda problem”
or Wason’s selection task (see, e.g., Charness et al., 2010; van Lambalgen, 2013)—, it
is presently considered well-established that humans by and large overestimate the
extent to which their beliefs are true, correct, warranted, or reliably acquired vis-àvis alternative beliefs or belief-forming methods (confirmation bias). In some cases,
agents display behavior consistent with the assumption that they not only ignore,
but do not even perceive counterevidence; in other cases, should counter-evidence
register, this may occur for the sole-purpose of formulating rebuttals, the persuasive
strength of which may, in turn, be estimated incorrectly. Although the empirical
evidence may still count as “somewhat sketchy,”
[a] few studies have looked at people’s perceptions of specific influences that
compromise objectivity. Studies have shown people’s inclination to view those
whose opinions differ from their own as influenced by self-interest (Reeder, Pryor,
Wohl, & Griswell, 2005), personal affections (Frantz, 2006), political partisanship
(Cohen, 2003), an inability to see things fairly (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005),
and unwavering ideology (Robinson et al., 1995). (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008, p.
834)

Further evidence includes experimental studies that, by and large, even see
physicians report preferring a treatment with an 80% success-rate over a different
treatment with a 20% failure-rate. This is interpreted as a “framing effect.” After all,
despite otherwise identical content, the positively framed version of a message is
demonstrably preferred over the negative version. If experimental results transfer,
then similar effects hold both for everyday and professional judgment and action.
3. FALSE POLARIZATION
A standard teaching and learning activity (TLA), suitable, e.g., for an introductory
level course in critical thinking, might familiarize learners with a selection of biases.
This normally occurs by way of presenting written or transcribed examples of
externalized reasoning episodes (aka arguments) exemplifying one or more biases.
A typical assignment might consist in documenting additional examples from the
media, or from personal interaction. Such TLAs require applying a classification
schema in order to identify bias instances, much in the way that students might
apply a botanical taxonomy to identify plants in their neighbor’s backyard.
A shortcoming of TLAs that are designed in a similar “show & tell”-fashion, or
so Fischhoff (1982) demonstrates, is the unilateral improvement of the average
ability to discern biases ascribable to (the reasoning of) a third party. These TLAs
may be expected to increase the frequency of (correct) third party bias ascriptions,
yet fail in improving the ability to discern own biases. In the above metaphor,
students thus fail to apply their knowledge to the plants in their own backyard.
A social phenomenon sustained by such failure is known as false polarization
(Keltner & Robinson, 1993, 1996; Monin & Norton, 2003; Robinson, Keltner, Ward,
& Ross, 1995). The term refers to disputants’ tendency to overestimate the degree of
their disagreement, i.e., “how far apart the parties are” (Figure 1). Importantly, one
3
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may grant that disputants have good reasons to disagree in the first place (see
Zenker, 2012, Sect. 5). The issue, then, is not that groups or individuals polarize, but
that their perceived difference over some issue—when expressed as a comparative
distance (ordinal level)—is greater than their de facto difference. See Sunstein
(2002) for the “true” polarization phenomenon, where a group starts out with (a
joint belief in) some position, P, on an issue, then discusses, and ends with a (joint)
belief in a more extreme position, P*, or with a greater degree of (joint) belief in P.

Figure 1: Overestimating the Distance of Disagreement (from Pronin, Puccio, & Ross,
2002). The upper case illustrates an ordinal distance according to actual views. In
the lower two cases, opponent groups (triangles; circles) overestimate their
comparative distance.
As Kennedy and Pronin (2008) suggest, an apparently greater disagreement
invites the imputation of greater bias, and vice versa. They also suggest that bias
ascription correlates with opponents’ mutual expectations that the disagreement
will escalate, rather than be resolved through cooperation. Hence, “as viewpoints
become more radically opposed in a discursive context, the prospects worsen for
finding common ground from which either disputant may be engaged in productive
discussion” (Kenyon, forthcoming). Such overestimation, then, adds a gap to the true
distance between proponent and opponent position.
Puccio & Ross (1998), and Pronin, Puccio, & Ross (2002) suggest on the basis
of experimental evidence that a reliable way of improving the ability to self-discern
own biases—and, thus, mitigate or avoid false polarization—consists in considering
the strengths and weaknesses of positions and reasoning not endorsed personally
(aka “seriously considering the other side”). Also see Larrick (2008, p. 323f.)
Partisans in the express-own-position condition in these studies showed the
expected false polarization effect, markedly overestimating the gap between the
positions of the two sides. By contrast, participants in the express-other-position
(and, in one study, those in a third condition in which they expressed both
positions) hardly overestimated this gap at all. (Pronin, Puccio, & Ross 2002, p. 653)
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Standardly, cognitive and social barriers are cited to explain the false polarization
effect. As with other biases, humans appear to suffer from a “bias blind-spot,” in the
sense of entertaining the belief that a bias is affecting others, but not themselves
(ibid.). Consequently, knowing about a bias will not suffice to mitigate own biases.
Possibly, there is a temptation to believe that introspection or will-power alone is
efficient for de-biasing. However, as Frantz (2006) and Hirt and Markman (1995)
submit, introspection and mental effort may, in some cases, even make a bias worse.
Some authors further hold that a merely cognitive effort may, in particular cases,
remain insufficient for de-biasing (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000). Perhaps an
emotional component, or a quasi-religious experience, might be required.
More specific to false polarization, under normal conditions there are social
barriers which may, in the presence of opponents or in-group members, keep
disputants from openly admitting that they are, or have been, prone to biases. After
all, granting reasonable elements of an opponent’s position may appear disloyal, or
hostile, to one’s in-group. In doing so, one may further provide the material for an
opponent’s ex concessis attack—widely thought to be the most persuasive form of
counter-argument. Finally, one may appear weak-minded to observers or audiences.
We now lay out a way for these barriers to be potentially overcome in the
context of class-room instruction.
4. FOSTERING THE ABILITY TO SELF-DISCERN BIASES
From learners, this teaching and learning activity (TLA) demands engaging in
‘counterfactual meta-cognition’, i.e., engaging in reasoning episodes that one does
not agree with personally. Required from instructors is an above average ability to
(prepare teaching materials that) present a balance of reasoning and argumentation
originating at both sides of an issue. Typical examples are found in social policy
controversies (e.g., Zenker, 2010 on human embryonic stem cell research). A
background in discourse analysis and informal logic may be found indispensable.
The success of this TLA will also depend on personal qualities of the instructor,
notably situational knowledge, trustworthiness, and neutrality (see Section 6).
Generally, the following can be situated in the (age old) ‘Forum Movement’tradition (Keith, 2007), and may claim support from research results obtained in
social and cognitive educational psychology laid out, for instance, by Kuhn (1992).
4.1 Analytical description
The TLA (i) assesses the position a learner holds on some issue (by indicating
distances, as in Figure 1, above), (ii) then assigns the learner to a group of similarly
opinioned students who discuss arguments supporting an opposite or, at any rate, a
different position, in order to (iii) better estimate the strengths and weaknesses of
these positions (individually and through teacher feedback), before (iv) learners
report that position, and (v) compare it to their initial distance estimate.
On the basis of (v), the identification of biases in the initial assessment may
be pursued. It then becomes a precondition that, prior to this TLA, students acquire
some familiarity with the bias literature. In terms of decreasing the distance of
5
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disagreement, however, learning does not seem to depend on such familiarity.
4.2 Sequential description
Stepwise, with structural-learning terms (McKeachie & Svinicki, 2006) bracketed
(steps 1 and 8 require dedicated sessions):
1.
Standard presentation of the bias literature with examples and
discussion.
2.
The group agrees on a topic that students potentially polarize over,
such that subgroups for the most part either favor or disfavor a
position (such as capital punishment, genetic modification, just war,
nuclear energy, gun control, etc., or more mundane topics such as
“The new university policy on …”).
3.
Group members call out reasons pro/con one or the other position
(pre-structural). Reasons are noted (on the blackboard or via
electronic means) under two columns: favor (pro) vs. disfavor (con)
(uni-structural).
4.
The group provides an initial structure over these reasons by
distinguishing reasons that are motivated by value-considerations
from those motivated by the (non-)desirability of effects (deontic vs.
consequential) (multi-structural).
5.
Members self-identify as endorsing one rather than another position,
and are allocated to subgroups (of 5-7 participants, ideally). Those
endorsing position X are assigned to a subgroup engaging with a
position that entails: X is false. More than two subgroups can be
formed, if the number of learners requires it. Members who have a
neutral attitude to the issue at hand can be assigned observer-roles.
They meet with a group, but do not interact argumentatively. Their
function is to later provide a third party report on the group
interaction. In particular, they should record which reasons were
(not) discussed intensely.
6.
Subgroups discuss the reasons made available earlier and relate proreasons with con-reasons, so as to create a structure in which a proreason should “meet” with a dialectically adequate con-reason (e.g.,
one reason may provide a rebuttal or a critique of, or a rejoinder, or a
follow-up claim to, another reason). Learners can both generate and
check their pairings by entertaining questions such as “Why might a
reasonable person believe the opposing view?” or “If I believed the
opposing view, what would my best reasons be?” Subsequently,
reasons are added, and may be strengthened/weakened through
additional information (relational level). This can occur through input
from the instructor, or from other learners. Subgroups then present
the position they have engaged in to subgroup members.
7.
Subgroups return to the plenum, and present their order and
structure over pro/con reasons, pointing out new information that
was developed in the subgroup. The structures are compared and
6
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8.

discussed, to “pick the best of each,” i.e., arrive at a joint structure, or a
similarity class thereof. (Argument diagramming software may prove
helpful here.) This serves to observe which reasons have not met with
an adequate con-reason, thus identifying the strongest reasons
pro/con an issue, on the assumption that a given reason—provided
other qualities such as internal consistency—may not be assigned a
non-arbitrary defeater, including considerations of moral value
(abstract level).
In a dedicated session, at least one day after the previous, learners
return to their initial assessment of the positions endorsed, and seek
to re-assess if and why they initially considered reasons to be, in a
relevant sense, stronger than they turned out to be. Naming biases
becomes conditionally relevant here. After all, students may wish to
provide to themselves some explanation why they had initially
thought of some position as stronger or weaker. Citing own biases
provides such an explanation. Based on this re-assessment, students
should be able to identify which of a set of biases may account for
their initial assessment. Hence, it is not so important to “get the name
of a bias right,” but to enable students to comprehend that a bias may
be at work in their own reasoning.

5. LEARNING OUTCOMES CROSSED WITH ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
Assessment techniques (Table 1) are chosen such that (i) instructors can provide
feedback on the initial (“preparatory”) and the final learning outcome; (ii) peers
(subgroups) provide intermediate feedback, followed by (iii) group feedback.
Discerning one’s own biases is an individual task, and so is collecting evidence of
biases in natural language discourse. The minute papers serve to “get the facts
straight.” The more important assessments involve feedback on the application and
transfer of knowledge, and discussion, to discourage surface-learning.

7

1. Report standard explanations why human
reasoning is prone to biases.
2. Describe the character of such biases in your own
terms, and give examples.
3. Identify biases on the basis of third party
argumentative language, written or spoken.
4. Express at least one standpoint on the following
question issue: …?
5. Apply your new knowledge to your own
standpoints, by identifying one on which you may
(have) entertain(ed) a biased view. (Name the bias.)



Group Work, Oral
Presentation, Feedback

Successful Learners will be able to …

Individual Work, Oral
Presentation, Feedback

Learning Outcome

Essay with Peer Review

Minute Paper

Assessment Technique

Field Observation,
Presentation, Feedback
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Table 1: Assessment Techniques crossed with learning outcomes
6. DISCUSSION
In simple terms, the immediate purpose of the TLA is for learners to become more
familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of their own positions, by becoming
aware of positions they do not endorse personally. This is here called “engaging
with the other side.” Through such engaging, one’s own biases may be better
discerned than without such engaging, or so is the central assumption.
The more general goal is to provide students with two cognitive benefits: (i)
an awareness of the insidiousness of bias, according to which an initial sense of
being unbiased should not preclude taking steps to de-bias anyhow; and (ii) a model
for de-biasing that implicates charitable engagement with interlocutors’ views,
rather than a mere self-check of one’s presumably good intentions.
Besides character traits (e.g., intellectual courage), learning success depends
on the quality of the argumentative material made accessible to learners (see
below), and on how success is measured. As for measurement, it is here considered
relatively unimportant that learners acquire the entrenched term for some biases,
as these are used in the literature. In principle, learners may very well pick their
own names, then compare those—through assistance from the instructor—to the
technical term(s). Hence, success should not be measured by the student’s ability to
correctly repeat terms, but by the ability to identify the “character” of a bias. At the
same time, should a significant number of students not be able to self-discern a
single bias in their own initial assessment of a position they endorse personally, the
TLA should likely count as a failure.
Secondly, the cognitive availability of plausible counterfactuals is a partial
function of one’s actual commitments. So, learners may not readily succeed at
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contemplating reasons which support a view incompatible with their own:
“[F]inding such reasons is likely to be difficult, and the judge [or agent] may infer
from this difficulty that there are not many—or else they would not be so difficult to
generate” (Sanna et al., 2002). Instructors will need to prepare for such difficulty,
i.e., prepare to deliver reasons unknown to learners, in ways that will be found
accessible.
After all, it cannot reasonably count as a learner’s “fault,” should instructors
withhold on relevant considerations. To give but one example, to reasonably engage
with the nuclear energy-issue, a long term perspective (of several generations) and
the rate of radioactivity decay better be mentioned. This recommends using
material that is already studied to some extent, for instance in controversy studies
(van Eemeren et al., 2009)—a strand of discourse analysis—or in better quality
critical thinking textbooks (e.g., Kenyon, 2008).
As indicated above, visual representations of debates (“controversy maps”)
may be provided. Some—e.g., scientific controversies such as the corpuscle vs. wave
interpretation of light—will not be suitable in all conditions. Generally, a trade-off
may be unavoidable between “keeping facts straight” and keeping learners engaged
in issues they take positions on. See Newell, Beach, Smith, & Van Der Heide (2011).
7. SUMMARY
This TLA relies on empirical evidence that standard ways of teaching the heuristics
and biases literature are unlikely to improve learners’ abilities at discerning their
own biases, ceteris paribus. We described a TLA geared towards such improvement.
Its success depends on learners engaging cognitively with the reasoning of another
party in an instructor-guided manner. The TLA can potentially help groups that
disagree on some contested issue avoid the effects of false polarization.
It is less important that learners acquire knowledge of a bias’ technical term,
though the TLA can be adapted to this outcome. Having stressed the role of a
qualified teacher, learning outcomes and assessment techniques were proposed,
and sources for teaching material pointed out.
The instructor’s most important tasks consist in the development/adaptation
of this material, and the “fine tuning” of the TLA to students’ needs and
prerequisites over a total of three deployments. This includes determining the
appropriate time the TLA shall take, as well as the preceding and subsequent TLAs,
e.g., a lecture and a reflection-unit.
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